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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner
bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623,
Defendant/Respondent.

Case No, 900150
:

Brief of Appellant

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3) (j) (1953, as
amended).
2. This appeal is brought by Plaintiff pursuant to Rule
3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, A forfeiture action
was filed by the State of Utah in the Second Judicial District
Court of Utah in an in rem proceeding against one 1986 Red Toyota
4-Runner automobile.

A trial was subsequently held before the

Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on January 25, 1990 at which time the
court entered an order denying Plaintiff's request for forfeiture
of the vehicle.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. At what point in time does the State obtain ownership
of property used in violation of Utah Code Ann, §58-37-13 (1987, as

amended).
2.

Can a third party obtain any interest in property

that has been seized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (1987, as
amended).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (1987,
as amended), is determinative and is set forth as an addendum to
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A few days prior to January 6, 1989, David Nance, an
agent

with

the

Davis

Metro

Narcotics

Task

Force,

received

information from an agent with the Utah State Tax Commission that
a 1986 Toyota 4-Runner had been seen bearing a license plate that
was registered to a motorhome.

(Trial transcript at page 5,

hereinafter referred to as T. 5)
On January 6, 1989, Agent Nance observed Mike Gartrell
driving the Toyota 4-Runner (T. 6, line 6-9).
Agent Nance, along with Agents Lon Brian and Agent
Richard Bliss, responded to the home of Lori Taylor where they
observed the Toyota 4-Runner in her driveway. Upon making contact
with Miss Taylor she informed the agents that the vehicle belonged
to Mike Gartrell. (T. 6-7)
As the agents were leaving, Mike Gartrell arrived and
when the agents spoke to him concerning the vehicle, he stated the
Toyota 4-Runner was owned by his brother, Troy Gartrell.

(T. 7-8)

Agent Nance was aware that the Utah State Tax Commission
2

had a lien and execution for any property owned by Troy Gartrell.
(T. 8-9)
The

agents

then

impounded

the

Toyota

improper registration and for the State Tax lien.

4-Runner

for

(T. 9)

An inventory search of the vehicle was conducted and
illegal narcotics were found inside the vehicle.

The vehicle was

then seized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (1987, as
amended). (T. 10-14)
The items seized were processed by the Weber State Crime
Lab and it was determined that the items did in fact contain
cocaine. (T. 35-36)
The following day, Agent Lon Brian received a phone call
from Mike Gartrell who stated that he was mistaken and that the
Toyota 4-Runner belonged to him and not to his brother, Troy
Gartrell. (T. 42)
Two or three days after the seizure took place, Agent
Brian received a phone call and had contact with a Brad Jenkins who
stated that he was in fact the owner of the Toyota 4-Runner. (T.
51)
On the 14th day of January, 1989, Constance Gartrell met
with Brad Jenkins and purchased the Toyota 4-Runner from him for
the sum of $9,000.00. (T. 71-72, T. 99-100)
At the time of the purchase, she was given a bill of sale
which specifically included the fact that the Toyota 4-Runner had
been impounded and seized by the State of Utah and that it would be
her responsibility to "retrieve it". (Exhibit 1)
3

That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (1987, as
amended), a verified complaint seeking the forfeiture of the 1986
Toyota 4-Runner was filed with the Second Judicial District Court
and all parties know to the County Attorney's Office, who at one
time claimed, or were implicated as having interest in the vehicle,
were served with notice of the action.
That the only interested party to answer the complaint
was Constance Gartrell. All others including Mike Gartrell, Troy
Gartrell, and Brad Jenkins failed to answer the complaint by the
time period allowed by law, and as a result their default was
entered.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Property that is used or intended for use in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (1987, as amended) is forfeitable to the
State and title to said forfeitable property vests in the State at
the time the illegal use occurs.

This vesting precludes a

subsequent transfer of the property or interest in said property to
any person for any purpose.

The property itself is tainted upon

the commission of the illegal act and any transfer made thereafter
is null and void.

In addition, if the proven owner of seized

property is properly notified of proceedings and fails to answer
the verified complaint within the time frame allowed by law, the
court shall order the release of the property to the petitioner
entitled to receive it. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(f) (1987, as
amended).

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE VEHICLE VESTED AT
THE TIME IT WAS USED IN VIOLATION OF THE
FORFEITURE STATUTE.
In the State of Utah, §58-37-13 Utah Code Ann. (1987, as
amended) provides that certain items of property when used in
violation of the Controlled Substance Act become forfeitable.
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1)(e) (1987, as amended)
provides that:
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture,
and no property right exists in them: . . .
(e) all conveyances including aircraft,
vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use,
to transport, or in any manner facilitate the
transportation,
sale,
receipt,
simple
possession, or
concealment
of
property
described in Subsections (l)(a) or (l)(b). . .
A forfeiture proceeding is a civil in rem action against
an item of property which has been used in violation of the law and
is based on the theory that the property itself has committed the
offense and is guilty of the wrongdoing. United States vs. Nichols,
841 F2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); State vs. Nine Thousand One Hundred
Ninety-Nine Dollars, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1990).
Because of this taint upon the property, the courts have
generally held that at that particular instant, all rights and
legal title to the property pass to the government in seizure;
formal proceedings simply confirm the forfeiture that has already
taken place.

In United States vs. One Hundred Barrels Distilled

Spirits 81 U.S. at 56-57, 20 L.Ed 816-817, the court stated:
5

... [I]t must be admitted . . . beyond all doubt,
that forfeiture becomes absolute at the
commission of the prohibited actsf and that the
title from that moment vests in the United
States in all cases when the statute in terms
denounces the forfeiture of the property as a
penalty for a violation of law, without giving
any alternative remedy, or prescribing any
substitute for the forfeiture, or allowing any
exceptions to its enforcement, or employing in
the enactment any language showing a different
intent...
This presumption is now uniformly followed in every state and
federal jurisdiction. Most recently, the Utah Court of Appeals had
the opportunity to review and accept this presumption as well. In
State vs. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 132 Utah
Adv. Rep. 40 (1990), the Court stated:
[N]o property right exists in property subject
to forfeiture.
This reference to property
rights incorporates the rule that titles to
forfeitable property vests in the State at the
time a criminal act is committed.
In the present case, the vehicle which is the subject of
this action was seen being driven by Mike Gartrell on the 6th day
of January, 1989. Shortly thereafter the vehicle was impounded and
cocaine and drug paraphernalia were found in the vehicle. Clearly
the vehicle had been used to transport, or to facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of
controlled

substances in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-

13(1)(e) (1987, as amended).

Therefore, in accordance with state

statute, title to the vehicle vested in the State of Utah at the
time of violation, that being January 6, 1989, when ownership of
the vehicle was with Brad Jenkins.

6

POINT II.
A THIRD PARTY CANNOT OBTAIN TITLE OR INTEREST
TO PROPERTY AFTER IT HAS BEEN SEIZED BY THE
STATE.
If title to forfeitable property vests in the State at
the time a criminal act occurs, then the next question is whether
a third party can take or obtain any interest in said forfeitable
property after it has been seized.

Several federal cases have

dealt with this issue and are in total agreement that a bona fide
purchaser having no knowledge that the property is forfeitable, who
pays for said property in an "arms length" transaction, does not
acquire an interest in the property.

The United States Supreme

Court in United States vs. Stowell, 10 S.Ct. 244 (1890) at 247,
stated:
By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever
a statute enacts that upon the commission of a
certain act specific property used or connected
with that act shall be forfeited, the
forfeiture takes effect immediately...; and the
condemnation, when obtained, relates back to
the times and avoids all intermediate sales and
alienation even to purchasers in good faith,
(emphasis added)
This holding appears to have been followed in most state and
federal courts, see Simons vs. U.S. , 541 F2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1976);
Florida Dealers and Growers Bank vs. U.S., 279 F2d 673 (5th Cir.
1960); Wingo vs. U.S., 266 F2d 421 (5th Cir. 1959); 7 Fifths Old
Grand Dad Whiskey vs. U.S., 158 F.2d 24 (10th Cir. 1946); U.S. vs.
One 1954 Model Tudor Ford, 167 F.Supp. 864 (ED SC 1958); U.S. vs.
One 1954 Model Ford Victoria, 135 F.Supp 809 (ED NC 1955);
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State vs. Cherry, 387 S.W.2d 149 (TX App. 1965); and Weathersbee
vs. U.S., 263 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1958).
In following this line of reasoning, the Utah Court of
Appeals in quoting from United States vs. $41,305.00 In Currency,
802 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1986), stated:
Illegal use [of money] immediately vests title
to the property in the sovereign, and cuts off
the rights of third parties to obtain legally
protectible interests in the property. State
vs. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine
Dollars, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1990).
In the present case, the District Court held that the
Toyota 4-Runner, which is the subject of this action, was properly
seized and forfeitable to the State of Utah.

Therefore, even if

Constance Gartrell had purchased the Toyota 4-Runner in good faith,
without knowledge that the vehicle had been seized, she could not
have obtained any interest in that property.
However, Constance Gartrell did not purchase the vehicle
in good faith or without knowledge. At the time she purchased the
vehicle from Brad Jenkins, she was told that the vehicle had been
seized.

The bill of sale, acknowledged by Constance Gartrell and

dated January 14, 1989, specifically states that the Toyota 4Runner "was under impound and seizure by the State" and that she
was receiving "total responsibility to retrieve [the vehicle]".
Once a purchaser is put on notice that a transaction
might be tainted and that the item to be purchased may not be free
and clear of all liens, then said purchaser is required to make

8

further inquiry as to the status of the lien.

In Myer vs. General

American Corporation, 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), this Court stated
that,
. . . [Constructive notice is sufficient to
defeat the purchaser's claim.
Constructive
notice can occur when circumstances arise that
should put a reasonable person on guard so as
to require further inquiry on his part.
In it's ruling on the present case, the trial court
stated that whether Constance Gartrell understood what a "seizure"
was, she certainly understood it was both impounded and had been
seized.
Therefore, Ms. Gartrell was aware of the State's claim of
interest in the vehicle, and with knowledge, a reasonable person
would have been put on guard so as to make an inquiry into this
claim.

A simple phone call made prior to purchasing the vehicle

would have revealed the facts surrounding the State's claim.
However, such a phone call was not made until after the transaction
was finalized between Constance Gartrell and Brad Jenkins.
An additional factor to consider is the operative effect
of the default by Brad Jenkins upon the claim of Constance
Gartrell. A default is in essence an admission of the truth of all
the material allegations of the complaint and as an admission of
the cause of action.

It is an admission that the plaintiff is

entitled to judgment as prayed.
The District Court, on September 5, 1989, entered default
against Brad Jenkins, thus constituting an admission by Mr. Jenkins
that the vehicle was used in violation of the Controlled Substance
9

Act as stated in the Verified Complaint and should properly be
forfeited to the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force. Since Jenkins
was the predecessor in interest to Mrs. Gartrell, this admission
should serve to additionally taint any claim she might make to the
vehicle.

The admission in effect acknowledges that the illegal

activity should require forfeiture of the vehicle.
Therefore, Constance Gartrell was not, in fact, a good
faith purchaser and pursuant to this Court's recent findings in
State vs. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, supra,
could not obtain ownership or interest in the 1986 Toyota 4-Runner.
CONCLUSION
Property which has been used in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §58-37-13 (1987, as amended) is forfeitable and title to that
property vests in the State of Utah at the moment the property is
used in violation of the statute. Once the property has been used
in violation of the statute and title has vested to the State, a
third party cannot thereafter obtain ownership or interest in said
property. Therefore, Constance Gartrell does not have any interest
or ownership in the 1986 Toyota 4-Runner and said vehicle is
forfeitable to the State of Utah.

Appellant therefore prays that

the 1986 Toyota 4-Runner be forfeited pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-13 (1987, as amended).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j&

^

^

day of June, 1990.

^

^

r

St&/(?h V. Maj6f ^ - - _ ^ _
Attorney f o r / P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t
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ADDENDUM
A.

Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

B.

Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended)

C.

Utah Code Ann., §58-37-13 (1987, as amended) et seq.

D.

Bill of Sale (Exhibit 1)

E.

District Court Order and Findings of Fact
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A.

Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

Rule 3.

Appeal as of right: How taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An
appeal may be taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from
all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by
law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district
court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant
to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal
does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for
such actions as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may
included dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney's fees.

B.

Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended)

78-2-2.

Supreme Court jurisdiction.
•

• •

(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
•

• •

(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction.
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Utah Code Ann., §58-37-13

58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure.
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and no property right exists in
them:
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this act;
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering,
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property
described in Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or
intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this
act;
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described
in Subsections (l)(a) or (1Kb), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited
under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in
charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation
of this act;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's
knowledge or consent; and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security
interest is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation
would or did take place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this act;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this act, all proceeds
traceable to any violation of this act, and all moneys, negotiable instru723

58-37-13

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

ments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this act: but:
(i) An interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the
act;
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and
currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug
manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable
records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled
substances are forfeitable under this section; the burden of proof is
upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Controlled Substances Act; and
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating,
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in violation of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or
interest in real property is subject to the bona fide security interest of
a party who could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the
act;
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under
this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the
property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the
street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at
any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this
subsection.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace
officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over
the property. However, seizure without process may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding
under this act;
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has
been used or intended to be used in violation of this act.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted promptly.
724
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58-37-13

(4) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When property is seized under this act the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant
under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. Similarly, all substances
listed in Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state
are contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the state if the owners are
unknown.
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I
and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this
act, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths,
may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof
that he is the holder of a license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of
the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act by a finding of the court
that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request
that the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the
seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of
controlled substances laws, the district court having jurisdiction over the
case shall award the property to the seizing agency. The seizing agency
shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing and
pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may
not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defendant in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency,
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the
property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal costs for filing and
pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the property to the director of the Division of Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the
need for the property and the use to which the property will be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications
for property submitted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing agency
makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant
or seizing agency, where no application is made, who may obtain the
property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The
Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting agency or
725
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agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to exceed the amount of the net proceeds received for the sale of the property.
Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing
agency or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection
(8)(a) or (b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the
property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate, by destruction.
Proof of destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of
the department or his designated agent.
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a determination for forfeiture
to the state shall be made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the
county attorney where the property was seized or is to be seized and filed
in the district court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity:
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and
(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the district court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure of the property which is the subject
matter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, unless the
property has previously been seized without a warrant, under Subsection
58-37-13(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the
county clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all
persons known to the county attorney to have a claim in the property by
one of the following methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and address is known, at the
last known address of the claimant, or upon each owner whose right,
title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by
mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by certified mail to the
address given upon the records of the division, which service is
deemed complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but
who are believed to have an interest in the property, by one publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the
seizure was made.
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party
shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this act, any interested person or
claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under
this section, may file a petition in the district court for release of his
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest
in the property and his right to have it released. A copy shall be served
upon the county attorney in the county of the seizure, who shall answer
the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of
forfeiture.
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(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release,
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court
shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the property as the court determines. If the county attorney has not filed an
answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the petition
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court shall
order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the
end of 20 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days.
At this hearing all interested parties may present evidence of their rights
of release of the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The
court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the
case and order forfeiture or release of the property as it determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state,
(i) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the
property in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited
and direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The
division shall dispose of the property under Subsection (8).
(j) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture
and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture.
When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release,
the court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture,
and costs of sale; and
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund.
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and storage of the property, against the individual
or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may
assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the property as
appropriate.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 13; 1982, ch.
12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9; 1987, ch. 87, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective July 1, 1987, rewrote this section to the extent that a detailed analysis is
impracticable
Meaning of "this act" —- The term this

act" means Laws 1971, ch 145. which enacted
this chapter
Imitation Controlled Substances Act —
The Imitation Controlled Substances Act, referTed to in Subsection ilxh), appears as
w 58-37b-l to 58-37b-8
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Bill of Sale (Exhibit 1)
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E. District Court Judgment,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
144 SOUTH 500 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-8288
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
i

JUDGMENT

i

Case No. 45023

Plaintiff,

vs.
1986 RED TOYOTA 4-RUNNER,
BEARING VIN JT4RN6203G0057623

]i

Defendant.

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

]

Trial was held in above-entitled action before the Honorable
Douglas L. Cornaby on January 25, 1990. State of Utah was present
and represented by Steve Majors; Defendant/Claimant, Constance
Gartrell was present and represented by her counsel, David Paul
White.

The Court having heard all of the evidence produced and

having considered documentation entered into evidence, now makes
the following ORDER:
Said

vehicle

being

1986

Toyota

4-Runner

bearing

VIN

JT4RN6203G0057623 cannot be forfeited by the State of Utah and is
ordered returned to Constance Gartrell.
DATED this

day of

, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Douglas L. Cornaby
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
15

Steve Majors

DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
144 SOUTH 500 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-8288
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

i

Case No. 45023

1986 RED TOYOTA 4-RUNNER,
BEARING VIN JT4RN6203G0057623

i

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.
COMES NOW, the above-entitled Defendant, by and through its
counsel, David Paul White, and files the following Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. The vehicle in question was properly seized and impounded
on January 6, 1989, because of improper registration and operator
was driving on suspended license.
2.

Vehicle properly searched pursuant to impound on January

14, 1989. Constance Gartrell made lawful purchase of said vehicle
from previous owner, Brad Jenkins.
3.

State's notice of its intent to seize and forfeite was

mailed to Constance Gartrell on January 16, 1989.

4.

Complaint

for forfeiture filed on January 16, 1989.

Constance Gartrell answered said Complaint

as a Claimant and

interested party on said vehicle and trial on said Complaint was
held before the above-entitled Court on January 25, 1990.

On the

foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Said vehicle was properly seized and impounded.

2.

Inventory search of said vehicle was done properly and in

the regular course of police officer procedure.
3.

Constance Gartrell was an innocent purchaser of said

vehicle.
4.

State of Utah cannot forfeiture said vehicle and said

vehicle must be returned to Constance Gartrell.
DATED this

day of Febraury, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Douglas L. Cornaby
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Steve Majors
Deputy Davis County Attorney

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
)
: ss.
)

STEVEN V. MAJOR, being duly sworn, states that he is the
attorney for Appellant State of Utah and that he served four (4)
copies of the Brief of Appellant State of Utah upon:
David Paul White
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
144 South 500 East
Salt Lake City UT 84119
AND
that he did serve ten (10) copies of the Brief of Appellant State
of Utah upon:
Clerk of the Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City UT

84114

by personally delivering true copies thereof, on the ^?3

day of

June, 1990.

feVEN V. M A J Q g ^
Deputy Davis County Attorney
Attorney for Appellant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

^o>

day of June, 1990,
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